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HEATER v. FTC AND THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION IMPROVEMENT ACT: THE
FTC'S POWER TO ORDER RESTITUTION
Recent developments in the courts and Congress have signifi-
cantly affected the remedial options of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC). In Heater v. FTC," decided on September 4, 1974, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FTC, acting pursuant to
its cease and desist power, 2 could not remedy violations of the Federal
Trade Commission Acta (FTCA) by ordering the restitution of fraud-
ulently obtained money to the victims of the illegal practices. 4 On
January 4, 1975, President Ford signed into law the Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act,5 which gives the Commission authority
to bring an independent judicial action to obtain remedial relief, includ-
ing restitution, on behalf of consumers injured by violators of a Com-
mission cease and desist order.6 The Commission's interpretation of
this law and its reaction to the Heater decision have caused consider-
able uncertainty as to the present state of the FTC's remedial powers.
This Recent Development will examine the Heater decision and
the recent amendments to the FTCA as they affect the FTC's ability
to remedy violations of the Act and violations of a cease and desist or-
der. Initially, the FTC's past practices and justification for ordering
1. 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
2. If... the Commission shall be of the opinion that the method of competi-
tion or the act or practice in question is prohibited ... it shall ... issue and
cause to be served on such person, partnership or corporation an order requir-
ing such person, partnership or corporation to cease and desist from using such
method of competition or such act or practice. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C.A. H9 45 (1), (m), 46, 53, 56 (Supp. 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. §
41-58 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-637 (Jan. 4, 1975). Section 5 of the
FTCA now provides inter alia that: "(a) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are de-
clared unlawful." Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201(a) (Jan. 4, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a) (1970), reprinted in 4 TRADB RaG. REP. 25,245. If the FTC finds a
violation of section 5, it may issue a cease and desist order. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)
(1970). See note 2 supra.
4. 503 F.2d at 321-22.
5. Pub. L. No. 93-637 (Jan. 4, 1975). See note 29 infra for text of pertinent sec-
tions.
6. Id. § 204(a)(2), reprinted in 4 TAiE REc. RaP. 25,268. The Commission
is given authority to seek relief for a violation of a rule it issued under the FrCA re-
lating to unfair or deceptive acts or practices (other than an interpretative rule or a rule
the violation of which the Commission has provided is not an unfair or deceptive act
or practice in violation of section 5(a)). Id. § 206(a)(1), reprinted in 4 TFtDa RaG
REP. 25,271.
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restitution as part of a cease and desist order will be set forth. An
analysis of Heater and its effects will follow. Finally, the Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act will be considered in terms of
how it changes the FTC's remedial options and the light it sheds upon
the Heater opinion.
Prior to Heater, it was the policy of the FTC to incorporate a resti-
tution provision within a cease and desist order in certain circumstances
where such a remedy was necessary to prevent the continuation of past
unlawful conduct and to redress injury to competition attributable to
the violation.7  Thus, the FTC would typically issue a cease and desist
order for a flagrant violation s of the FTCA and would include within
the order a requirement that the violator refund to his customers the
monies which he had obtained from them, even if the monies had been
obtained prior to the issuance of the Commission's cease and desist or-
der.0 In defending this practice, the Commission has had to counter
arguments that such a refund provision was beyond its cease and de-
sist power because it was retroactive, punitive, or an award of private
7. See Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1513 (1971). The FTC complaint
in Curtis attacked the company's failure to offer subscribers refunds, in addition to a
choice of alternative subscriptions to other magazines, after the Saturday Evening Post
ceased publication. The hearing examiner rejected the Commission's proposed refund
order on the grounds that it exceeded the authority of the Commission under the FTCA,
id. at 1502, and that Curtis did not have sufficient assets to make refunds in any case,
id. at 1511. The full Commission rejected the examiner's contention that the order ex-
ceeded its authority and held that the FTC had the power to require refunds of custom-
ers' money obtained by a respondent prior to the issuance of the Commission's com-
plaint. Id. at 1511-18. However, the Commission went on to affirm the examiner's
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Curtis was financially unable to make re-
funds. Id. at 1523-24. Since dismissal mooted any appeal to the courts, the Commis-
sion's holding regarding its power to order refunds is of doubtful precedential value and
amounted to little more than a "brief" in support of its position. See also Bower, New
Developments in FTC Remedies, 41 ANIntUST L.J. 465 (1972).
8. The Commission has been particularly prone to issue restitutionary orders where
the violation has been flagrant and knowingly fraudulent. See, e.g., Holiday Magic,
Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,757 (FTC Final Order, Oct. 15, 1974), where the Com-
mission observed:
With regard to the propriety of restitution in this particular case, we believe
it is clear beyond peradventure. Illegality permeated every facet of the promo-
tion of the Holiday Magic marketing program. . . . There is every indication
in the record that respondent Patrick regarded institution of the Commission's
suit not as a sign to go slow, but as a spur to intensify the heist. Retention
of deceptively and illegally obtained property is as much a violation of Section
5 as continuation of the deception. Our duty is to enjoin both. Id. at 20,618
(emphasis added).
9. See, e.g., Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,757 (FTC Final Order,
Oct. 15, 1974); Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 82 F.T.C. 570 (1973); Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472 (1971). See also Cookware Associates, 40 F.T.C. 654
(1945); Interstate Home Equip. Co., 40 F.T.C. 260 (1945); Success Portrait Co., 35
F.T.C. 227 (1942). But cf. Credit Card Serv. Corp., 82 F.T.C. 191 (1973), enforced,
495 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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compensatory damages. 10 The Commission relied upon cases where
the Supreme Court had upheld FTC orders requiring other affirma-
tive undertakings, such as divestiture," patent licensing,' 2 and correct-
ive advertising.'3 Furthermore, the Commission argued that restitu-
tionary relief was within its cease and desist power because some de-
ceptive practices cannot be adequately remedied by an order which
merely enjoins the recurrence of the practice.'4 Additionally, the FTC
urged a comparison of its remedial powers to those of a court of eq-
uity,15 which has great flexibility in designing a proper remedy, includ-
10. See Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1502-04 (1971):
While cease and desist orders are supposed to be prohibitory, the Commission's
proposed order would require the initiation of affirmative undertakings. While
cease and desist orders apply only prospectively to future conduct, the Com-
mission's proposed order would apply retroactively to conduct completed. And
while a cease and desist order is not compensatory for past damage but only
prohibitory of future deceptive conduct, the Commission's proposed order...
would have respondents pay a money judgment to former Post subscribers
.... In each respect, the proposed order exceeds the authority of the Com-
mission under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. at 1502 (Opinion of
Hearing Examiner).
In rejecting the hearing examiner, the Commission stated that an order granting resti-
tutionary relief may actually operate prospectively. Since retention of funds obtained
by illegal practices might place the unscrupulous wrongdoer in a stronger financial and
competitive position than his law-abiding counterparts, restitution would prospectively
restore the desired competitive balance among the parties. Id. at 1516.
In answer to the hearing examiner's claims that restitution was punitive or an award
for private compensatory damages, the Commission argued that this was not the case
where restitution was necessary to terminate an illegal practice or to cure its effects. It
cited Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946), where the Supreme
Court emphasized that restitution could be justified as a tool to enforce compliance with
a federal statute and was therefore distinguishable from a punitive or compensatory dam-
age remedy. 78 F.T.C. at 1517. In such cases, the Commission's order directing resti-
tution is primarily to vindicate public rights to be free from illegal practices and all their
effects; the benefit to private persons who are restored to the status quo is merely an
incidental aspect of the Commission's order. See id. at 1518.
11. See L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971) (requiring jeweler
in national high school and college ring market to divest itself of subsidiary in order
to restore competition in the market); Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63
(1971), affd in pertinent part, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972); Curtis Publishing Co.,
78 F.T.C. 1472, 1513 (1971).
12. See American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966) (requiring
licensing under a patent and the furnishing of technical know-how to competitors). The
case was remanded and decided by the Commission in American Cyanamid Co., 72
F.T.C. 623, affd, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969). See
also Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1513 (1971).
13. See J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (requiring the
manufacturers of Geritol to disclose affirmatively in its advertising that vitamin or iron
deficiency anemia was not the cause of tiredness in great majority of people). See gen-
erally Note, Corrective Advertising-The New Response to Consumer Deception, 72
COL M. L. REV. 415 (1972); Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal.
Trade Commission, 85 HAmv. L. REV. 477 (1971).
14. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1515-16 (1971).
15. This analogy was made by the Supreme Court in Pan Am. World Afrways v.
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ing the authority to order restitution. Finally, the Commission offered
further justification for its refund provision by characterizing the con-
tinuing retention of fraudulently obtained monies as an unfair trade
practice in itself.' 0 Thus viewed, ordering one holding such funds to
cease and desist from retaining them would be within the traditional
scope of the FTC's prohibitory power.
In Heater v. FTC,17 where the FTC had ordered the immediate
refund of monies raised in a flagrantly fraudulent credit card scheme,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the FTC's justifications
that its refund order was permissible either as a remedy under its cease
and desist authority or under its delegated power to define what consti-
tutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice, and struck down the rem-
edy as ultra vires the Commission's power.'- While recognizing that
the FTCA gave the Commission wide latitude in defining unfair trade
practices, the court ruled that use of this definitional power to accom-
plish an essentially remedial objective was inconsistent with the overall
purpose and design of the Act.'9 Although the framers of the FTCA
gave the Commission broad power to define a violation in order to pre-
vent clever circumvention of a more precise definition, they limited the
sanction for violating the FTCA to a cease and desist order which
would give violators specific notice and an opportunity to conform to
the terms of the FTCA before being held liable for their acts.20 Since
United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312 n.17 (1963). See also Curtis Publishing Co., 78
F.T.C. 1472, 1512 n.2 (1971).
16. Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 82 F.T.C. 570, 651 (1973). There is sub-
stantial authority giving the FTC broad power to determine what acts and practices are
unfair and deceptive. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FTC
v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
17. 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974). Heater involved a fraudulent credit card plan
and the FTC cease and desist order provided for immediate refund of franchise deposits
and fees, membership fees and dues, and travel expenses to all victims of the scheme.
Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 82 F.T.C. 570, 641 (1973).
18. 503 F.2d at 322-23. It should be noted that courts will normally not interfere
with the Commission's expert determination of the need for a particular remedy. In
Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946), the Supreme Court said:
The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to
eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It
has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except where
the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found
to exist. Id. at 612-13.
19. 503 F.2d at 323.
20. Id. at 324. "[Congress] withheld from the Commission the power to make a
determination which would expose the businessman to liability for acts occurring before
the Commission gave the general definition specific meaning in a factual context." Id.
See also 51 CoNG. REc. 13114 et seq. (1914). Although the Heater court's reading of
the legislative history appears correct, it is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme
Court's approval of other affirmative FTC remedies. Divestiture and corrective adVer-
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a refund requirement within an FTC cease and desist order would sub-
ject a businessman to liability for his acts which occurred before the
Commission had defined a statutory violation, and thus before the FTC
gave the required notice that the prior conduct was prohibited by the
Act, it was not within the remedial authority granted to the Commis-
sion.2 The Heater court distinguished those cases which have allowed
other affirmative remedies as curing public rather than private injuries,
stating that Congress chose to leave private injuries caused by viola-
tions of the FTCA to whatever common law remedies existed.22  The
court, however, was troubled because its decision would limit the
FTC's cease and desist authority to commanding violators to "go and
sin no more," which would allow an unscrupulous violator to engage
in conduct clearly forbidden by the FTCA without the threat of being
ordered to disgorge monies thereby obtained and to continue such ac-
tions until the FTC issues a cease and desist order.23  Nevertheless,
faced with the dilemma of weighing -two valid but seemingly irreconcil-
able concerns, the FTCA's policy of fair notice dictated a limitation
on the Commission's definitional and remedial powers while effective
deterrence of practices clearly illegal under the FTCA demanded
broad powers, the Heater court chose to forbid the FTC from order-
ing a refund of illicitly gained monies.
Reacting strongly to the limitation of its refund power, the FTC
immediately announced it would appeal the Heater decision,2 4 and con-
tinued to order restitutionary relief, even in the Ninth Circuit.25 How-
tising, for example, both impose economic costs attributable to conduct occurring before
the conduct is declared illegal. Yet they are condoned because they are thought neces-
sary to remedy the continuing effects of violations of the Act. See notes 11-13 supra
and accompanying text.
21. 503 F.2d at 323.
22. Id. at 325 n.13. But see note 20 supra.
23. Id. at 325 n.16.
Under the present design of the Act, those sufficiently unscrupulous or reckless
to engage in conduct clearly forbidden by the Act may do so until a cease and
desist order is entered, escaping with the fruits of the violation. In many situ-
ations no individual has a sufficient interest to bring a suit for redress, and
a violation of the Act may be quite profitable. Id.
For an example of this danger, see Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,757
(FTC Final Order, Oct. 15, 1974), quoted in note 8 supra.
24. Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 20,757, at 20,617 n.11 (Final FTC
Order, Oct. 15, 1974); see 697 BNA AN'rrusT AND TRADE REG. REP. A-19 (Jan. 21,
1975).
25. Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 TRADE RE. REP. 20,757 (Final FTC Order, Oct. 15,
1974). Holiday Magic involved a cosmetics concern which marketed its products by
means of an open-ended, multi-level distribution network displaying the attributes of the
familiar pyramid scheme. Id. at 20,612. The Commission ordered refunds to all fran-
chisees, who had invested millions of dollars in huge inventories of cosmetics. Id. at
20,61 . Se note 8 supra.
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ever, the Commission soon thereafter changed its position, withdrawing
both the appeal 26 and its outstanding refund order.27  Perhaps this
change in position was motivated by the recent amendments to the
FTCA, the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,28 which
offer an alternative resolution to the dilemma faced in Heater.
The "Consumer Redress" provision of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvement Act2 9 provides that the Commission may, after
issuing a final cease and desist order with respect to an unfair or de-
ceptive act or practice, commence a civil action in an appropriate court
on behalf of injured consumers.8 0 If the Commission satisfies the court
that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order is related
is one which a reasonable man would have known under the circum-
stances was dishonest or fraudulent, the court may grant whatever re-
lief is necessary to redress injury to consumers or others, including the
refund of money or return of property.31 Thus, not only may a con-
sumer gain a refund of his monies through an FTC initiated and con-
ducted civil suit, but the flagrant violator is also prevented from retain-
ing what Heater allowed him-those proceeds from conduct clearly
prohibited by the FTCA but which occurred before the issuance of a
final cease and desist order.2 Moreover, the FTCA's requirement of
26. 697 BNA ANTRrUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-18 to 19 (Jan. 21, 1975).
27. 699 BNA ANmrrRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. A-19 to 20 (Feb. 4, 1975).
28. Pub. L. No. 93-637 (Jan. 4, 1975).
29. Id. § 206, reprinted in 4 TRADE RuG. RE . f 25,271. Section 206 of the
amendment reads as follows:
[(a)1(2) If any person, partnership, or corporation engages in any unfair
or deceptive act or practice (within the meaning of section 5(a) (1)) with re-
spect to which the Commission has issued a final cease and desist order which
is applicable to such person, partnership, or corporation, then the Commission
may commence a civil action against such person, partnership, or corporation
in a United States district court or in any court of competent jurisdiction of
a State. If the Commission satisfies the court that the act or practice to which
the cease and desist order relates is one which a reasonable man would have
known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent, the court may
grant relief under subsection (b).
(b) The court in an action under subsection (a) shall have jurisdiction
to grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers
or other persons, partnerships, and corporations resulting from the rule viola-
tion or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be. Such relief
may include, but shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts,
the refund of money or return of property, the payment of damages, and pub-
lic notification respecting the rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or
practice, as the case may be; except that nothing in this subsection is intended*
to authorize the imposition of any exemplary or punitive damages.
30. Id. § 206(a)(2), reprinted in 4 TRADn RaG. REP. f 25,271.
31. Id. § 206(b), reprinted in 4 TRADE RaG. RaP. 25,271.
32. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. The language of section 206 of the
amendments, see note 29 supra, is somewhat ambiguous on this point, and at least one
FTC official has suggested that it enables the FTC -to seek restitution only if a company
violates a final order. 698 BNA ANTrr usr & TRADE REa. REP. A-20 (Jan. 28, 1975)
(comments of Miles W. Kirkpatrick). The legislative history, however, makes it clear
[Vol. 1975:379
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notice is preserved. The refund remedy is only authorized where the
Commission proves in court that the conduct violating the Act is that
"which a reasonable man would have known was dishonest or fraudu-
lent."33
Although the majority of the Commission has indicated that its
new authority to seek court-ordered restitution in limited circumstances
seems an ample substitute for its authority, which was denied in Heater,
to do so directly through a cease and desist order,3 4 the Commission's
decision to withdraw its appeal in the case was not a unanimous one.
Two Commissioners considered the Commission's power to grant resti-
tution directly to be of extreme importance. 5 They emphasized that
the new legislation makes clear that the consumer redress remedies are
to be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any pre-existing remedial au-
thority the Commission may have had under the preamendment
FTCA.36  Indeed, a Senate Report on a proposed but unenacted ver-
sion of the amendments indicates that the Senate assumed that the
Commission already had the "power to compel restitution by its own
order when such restitution is necessary to terminate a continuing vio-
lation. ' 37  Further, the dissenters noted that the amendments relate
that violation of a final order is not necessary and that section 206 relates to injuries
caused prior -to the issuance of the cease and desist order, i.e., prior to the time the con-
duct was formally declared illegal. See S. REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41
(1974); S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1973).
33. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 206(a) (2) (Jan. 4, 1975), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG.
REP. 25,271.
34. 700 BNA ANTrTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. F-1 (Feb. 11, 1975); see 698 BNA
ANTrusr & TRADE REG. REP. AA-1 to 3 (Jan. 28, 1975) (remarks of FTC Bureau
of Consumer Protection Director J. Thomas Rosch).
35. 700 BNA ANrrRusT & TRADE Rao. REP. F-1 (Feb. 11, 1975) (dissenting state-
ment of Commissioners Hanford and Nye).
36. Id. The new Act provides:
(e) Remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any other remedy or right of action provided by state or Federal law. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission
under any other provisions of law. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 206(e) (Jan. 4,
1975), reprinted in 4 TRADE REo. REP. 25,271.
37. S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1973):
inhere is no intent on the part of the Committee to disturb the Commission's
power to compel restitution by its own order when such restitution is necessary
to terminate a continuing violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. Section 203 [which was eventually to become section 206 of the
amendments and new section 19 of the Act] is applicable to those situations
where the Commission acts to make consumers whole and is not intended to
supplant general actions by the Commission which are designed to dissipate the
prior effects of unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
It should be noted, however, that the Conference Report on the amendments, while
claiming to preserve the Commission's pre-existing remedial powers, did not specifically
mention that the FTC had restitutionary powers.
S. REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974):
The section is intended to supplement the ability of the Commission to redress
Vol. 1975:379]
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only to remedies for "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" and do not
affect the Commission's remedial power for "unfair methods of com-
petition. '38 Where the circumstances surrounding an unfair method
of competition violation are such that restitution of money to consumers
is necessary to dissipate the anticompetitive effect of unlawful conduct,
the power to obtain restitution would appear to be an essential weapon
in the Commission's remedial arsenal.39 However, neither the amend-
ments nor the Heater decision would seem to allow such a remedy.
Finally, the dissenters feared that courts may be long in determining
the relationship between what is "unfair or deceptive" (the preamend-
ment statutory standard of issuing a cease and desist order) and what
is "dishonest or fraudulent" (that standard which a reasonable man
must knowingly violate before a refund order by a court will be per-
mitted under the amendments).4"
At present, it appears that the FTC is willing to accept its defeat
in Heater, at least insofar as "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" are
concerned, and to rely on the remedial provisions of the amendments
to correct such violations. The possibility remains open, however,
that the Commission will still order restitution under its own cease and
desist power when remedying "unfair methods of competition" which
are not covered by the amendments. Such an order would, of course,
challenge the rationale of Heater and its flat prohibition of FTC-ordered
refunds and reignite the controversy between the Commission and the
consumer and other injury resulting from violations of its rules or of section
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and is not intended to modify or
limit any existing power the Commission may have to itself issue orders de-
signed to remedy violations of the law. That issue is now before the courts.
It is not the intent of the Conferees to influence the outcome in any way.
38. 700 BNA ANcrrrusT & TRADE RaG. REP. F-1 n.3 (Feb. 11, 1975).
39. For example, if a businessman, by using an unfair method of competition, real-
izes substantial monetary gain and uses this gain to disrupt significantly the balance of
competition, an order which merely prohibited the unfair method in the future would
allow him the use of his ill-gotten gains to further his illegally obtained competitive ad-
vantage. An order requiring him to refund such monies would not only strip the vio-
lator of wrongfully obtained economic power but also allow consumers to place these
funds in legitimate competitive activities. In such cases, a restitutionary order would
be the only effective means of restoring the competitive status quo. Restitutionary relief
in such circumstances would be closely analogous to the affirmative remedies of divesti-
ture and corrective advertising allowed by the Supreme Court because necessary to re-
store competition. See Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., 82 F.T.C. 570, 652 (1973);
Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.T.C. 1472, 1515-16 (1971). Theoretically, then, by placing
an "unfair method of competition" label on the practice in question, the FTC could cir-
cumvent the apparent congressional preference for a court proceeding in restitution
cases, and order a refund directly under its cease and desist power. However, the valid-
ity of this approach remains questionable since it would seem to violate the fair notice
policy of the FTCA deemed so important by the court in Heater.
40. 700 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE Ra . REP. F-1 n.3 (Feb. 11, 1975).
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Ninth Circuit. The recent amendments to the FTCA, however, sug-
gest an analysis that should satisfy the Heater court's objections without
emasculating the Commission's cease and desist remedy. As previ-
ously noted, the Heater court objected to the FTC's refund order be-
cause it read the FTCA's legislative history as mandating prior notice
before a violator could be held liable for his acts.4 ' If the Comis-
sion would limit itself to including a refund provision in a cease and
desist order in those situations where a reasonable man would have
known he was violating the Act, the violator would have constructive
notice of his violation. Although the Commission labelled Heater's
conduct as "patently fraudulent," 42 Heater contended otherwise, and
the court found it unnecessary to decide the issue. The Heater court
proclaimed without support that Congress, out of a concern for "debat-
able cases," made a blanket prohibition of retroactive sanctions, even
for "exceptional violations" and with no exceptions. 43  Although the
court's reasoning for demanding a cease and desist order prior to im-
posing liability in normal cases makes eminently good sense, the court's
unsupported demand for such actual notice where constructive notice
is present, as it is for flagrant violations of the Act, is unpersuasive.
Furthermore, the adequacy of constructive notice in such instances is
recognized for the imposition of a similar sanction in the recent amend-
ments to the FTCA. 44  Therefore, the FTC should be able to issue
a cease and desist order which includes a refund requirement where
the violation of the FTCA was such that a reasonable man would have
known he was violating the law. If that argument is accepted, the FTC
will have the advantage of being able to issue directly a cease and desist
41. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
42. 503 F.2d at 325 n.15. The Commission argued "that notice considerations play
no part in this case because petitioner's acts were so patently fraudulent that he must
have known his conduct violated the Act." Id. In their Heater appeal brief, the Com-
mission emphasized that Heater's conduct was not simply a technical violation of the
Act: ' This is not a case of a business practice which, but for the guidance of the Com-
mission in its capacity as interpreter of the broad proscriptions of § 5, could colorably
have been considered legal and proper-this is a case, in popular vernacular, of a 'bunco'
operation, a confidence game." 503 F.2d at 322 n.4, quoting FTC Brief at 19, Heater
v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
43. 503 F.2d at 325 n.15.
44. Of course, the amendments require a court to rule on the propriety of granting
a restitutionary remedy, perhaps evidencing a congressional preference for judicial rather
than administrative proceedings when private relief is sought. Still, based on the legis-
lative history of the amendments (which evidenced a desire to preserve pre-existing FTC
remedial power) and the Supreme Court's prior indication that the FTC has the powers
of a court of equity, see note 15 supra, a post-Heater court could, consistent with the
notice policy of the FTCA, uphold the Commission's own restitutionary power in cases
of flagrant violations.
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order with a refund provision to cure unfair acts or practices, as well
as the alternative of seeking similar redress in a consumer redress civil
suit. More importantly, in unfair competition situations, the FTC will
not be prevented from obtaining any refund at all, and knowing vio-
lators will be prevented from retaining their bounty illicitly obtained
before a cease and desist order issued.
